In this paper, a fault-tolerant control (FTC) scheme is proposed for actuator faults, which is built upon tube-based model predictive control (MPC) as well as set-based fault detection and isolation (FDI). In the class of MPC techniques, tubebased MPC can effectively deal with system constraints and uncertainties with relatively low computational complexity compared with other robust MPC techniques such as min-max MPC. Set-based FDI, generally considering the worst case of uncertainties, can robustly detect and isolate actuator faults. In the proposed FTC scheme, fault detection (FD) is passive by using invariant sets, while fault isolation (FI) is active by means of MPC and tubes. The active FI method proposed in this paper is implemented by making use of the constraint-handling ability of MPC to manipulate the bounds of inputs. After the system has been detected to become faulty, the input-constraint set of the MPC controller is adjusted to actively excite the system for achieving FI guarantees on-line, where an active FI-oriented input set is designed off-line. In this way, the system can be excited in order to obtain more extra system-operating information for FI than passive FI approaches. Overall, the objective of this paper is to propose an actuator MPC scheme with as little as possible of FI conservatism and computational complexity by combining tube-based MPC and set theory within the framework of MPC, respectively. Finally, a case study is used to show the effectiveness of the proposed FTC scheme.
Introduction
In general, all technical systems are prone to faults. In a controlled system, if the plant itself is more reliable than the sensors and actuators used, when the closed-loop performance deviates from its normal situation, it is possible to find sensors and/or actuators that have become faulty. As faults can result in abnormal operation/failure, effectively dealing with faulty situations for technical systems is an important specification to assess the global
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is more flexible because it contains a fault diagnosis module to obtain real-time fault information. With the obtained fault information, AFTC can deal with faults more effectively. The fault diagnosis procedure embedded in an FTC scheme generally includes three steps: fault detection, fault isolation and fault estimation. Although AFTC is the topic of the proposed FTC scheme, this paper focuses more on the FD and FI tasks and assumes that actuator-fault magnitudes are known in advance. However, for FTC based on fault estimation and accommodation, the readers are referred to the works by Jiang and Chowdhury (2005) , Jiang et al. (2006) or Xu et al. (2012) . Additionally, due to a relatively low complexity and the ability of dealing with system constraints, MPC is chosen as the control strategy for the proposed scheme (Boskovic and Mehra, 2002; Maciejowski, 1999; Yang and Maciejowski, 2015) . As an optimization-based method, robust MPC itself has a degree of the PFTC ability with respect to additive uncertainties (Borrelli et al., 2013) .
In the work of Ocampo-Martinez et al. (2010) , an actuator FTC scheme using feedback-gain control and invariant sets was proposed, where a bank of controllers were designed to handle faults in different actuators and the FDI task was implemented by using invariant set-based passive FDI methods. However, this scheme does not consider constraints on system variables and needs to wait until the residual has entered into its invariant set to isolate faults. In the work of Sun et al. (2008) , a fault-tolerant model predictive control (FTMPC) scheme using the Kalman filter was proposed, which focused on the implementation of an FTMPC scheme without addressing in detail the features such as feasibility. Yetendje et al. (2011) presented an actuator FTMPC scheme with invariant set-based FDI, which had relatively low complexity because of the use of invariant sets for FDI. However, due to passive implementation of FDI, the set separation-based FDI condition is more conservative, which implies the loss of the potential FDI and FTC performance to some extent. The same authors extend the previous approach to the sensor case using a multisensor scheme (Yetendje et al., 2012) . Raimondo et al. (2013) proposed an FTMPC scheme using set-membership FDI. Their work used an approach that combined passive FD and active FI, but employed a different implementing method. The active FI method proposed by Raimondo et al. (2013) can reduce the FI conservatism, at the cost of high computational complexity due to the requirement of computing fault-separating inputs on-line. Moreover, the scheme proposed by Raimondo et al. (2013) does not provide guaranteed FI conditions to check in advance whether or not the faults considered are isolable.
Since faults in actuators and sensors generally have different features, the current paper focuses on actuator faults by exploiting the potential of the proposed scheme. In particular, the objective of this paper is to propose a new scheme of actuator FTMPC not only to obtain less conservative FI and FI guarantees, but also to implement FTC with relatively low complexity. The proposed FTC scheme can also obtain a balance between the FI complexity and conservatism. In the scheme, FD is passively implemented with invariant sets while FI is actively carried out by using MPC and tubes that can isolate faults during the transition induced by faults.
The principle of active FI consists in adjusting the input-constraint set of the MPC controller to an off-line designed FI-oriented input set that can guarantee FI. In real time, whenever a fault is detected, the designed input set is used as the temporary input-constraint set of the MPC controller to implement FI during the transition. Moreover, since this input set is constructed off-line, guaranteed FI conditions can be verified off-line by using invariant sets and established on-line by the MPC controller for on-line FI guarantees. The proposed FTC scheme is shown in Fig. 1 , where NS stands for nominal system and the subscript k is only used to show that the discrete-time system is considered in this paper.
The advantages of the proposed scheme are twofold. First, a new actuator FTC scheme integrating MPC with set-based FDI to retain the advantages is proposed. Second, a new active FI strategy built upon tube-based MPC to obtain FI guarantees as well as a balance of FI conservatism and complexity is implemented. The work presented in this paper is inspired by our preliminary results (Xu et al., 2014) .
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. Section 2, introduces the proposed FTC scheme. Section 3 presents the FDI strategy based on invariant sets and tubes. Section 4 introduces the FTC approach. In Section 5, a case study is used to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. Finally, Section 6 gives some conclusions on the approach.
Note that, in this paper, the inequalities are understood element-wise, O, I and diag(·) denote the zero, the identity and the diagonal matrices with suitable dimensions, respectively, |·| represents the element-wise absolute value, B r is a box composed of r unitary intervals, and ⊕ and denote the Minkowski sum and Pontryagin difference, respectively.
System description
2.1. Plant model. It is assumed that the monitored system is described by a linear discrete time-invariant model including actuator faults, disturbances and noises:
Robust MPC for actuator-fault tolerance using set-based passive fault detection and active fault isolation where A ∈ R n×n , B ∈ R n×p and C ∈ R q×n are constant parametric matrices,
are the state, input and output vectors at time instant k, respectively, ω k and η k are respectively unknown process disturbances and measurement noise vectors, and F is used to model actuator modes (healthy and faulty) which are important/critical for system performance/safety. In (1), matrix F incorporates the actuator modes considered. During real-time operation, a mode switching implies a change in the value of F (i.e., fault occurrence or system recovery to the healthy situation). Moreover, F is assumed to be constant for each mode but time-variant during the entire dynamical behavior where mode switchings are included. Assumption 1. (Disturbances and noises) ω k and η k are unknown but bounded by sets
respectively, where ω c , η c ,ω andη are assumed to be known and constant vectors.
Assumption 2. (Faults considered)
Single, abrupt and multiplicative faults are considered and the faults are assumed to be persistent, namely, the duration of the faults is longer than the detection and isolation time needed.
Under Assumption 2, it can be observed that F can take p + 1 different values, i.e., F = F i (i ∈ I = {0, 1, 2, . . . , p}). F 0 is the identity matrix denoting the healthy actuator mode while F i (i = 0) modeling the i-th actuator-fault mode is denoted as
where f i is a scalar inside the interval [0, 1), which models the actuator-fault magnitude of the i-th actuator.
Notice that it is possible to extend the proposed FTMPC scheme to deal with sensor faults, multiple faults and additive faults. For example, if there are more elements, rather than a single element different from "1" in the fault-modeling matrix F , the proposed method can be used to handle multiple faults (see Reppa et al., 2015) .
Assumption 3. (Stabilizability and detectability)
The pairs (A, BF i ) for all i ∈ I and (A, C) are stabilizable and detectable, respectively.
In this scheme, the input and state constraints are taken into account, which are denoted as
respectively, where the vectors x c , u c ,x andū are known and constant. W , V , X and U defined in (2) and (4) can be rewritten into zonotopes. Thus, in this paper, all set manipulations are implemented by zonotopes. The notion of zonotopes is given in Definition A1 in Appendix.
Output setpoints.
It is mentioned that p + 1 actuator modes are considered. Thus, the proposed FTMPC scheme should have p + 1 different nominal models, each corresponding to one mode. For the i-th mode, the corresponding nominal model is given as
whereū k ,x k andȳ k denote the nominal input, and state and output vectors, respectively. For simplicity, it is assumed that ω c and η c , representing the centers of the sets in (2a) and (2b), are zero vectors.
The control objective under the i-th mode is to regulate the output vector around a given setpoint y * i , i.e., in the absence of uncertainties,
2.3. Observers and controllers. The tube-based MPC technique used in this scheme taps into the results of Mayne et al. (2006) . As in their work, for each MPC controller, a state observer is designed. Thus, a bank of observers should be designed to match all modes, each observer matching one mode.
1 Correspondingly, the observer matching the j-th (j ∈ I) mode is designed aŝ
wherex j k andŷ j k are the estimated states and outputs, respectively, and L j is the j-th observer gain matrix that is selected to stabilize the observer dynamics (8), which is always possible under Assumption 3.
In order to control the system under different actuator modes, a bank of tube-based output feedback MPC controllers are used, each corresponding to one mode. The nominal system corresponding to the i-th mode is obtained by neglecting ω k and η k in (5).
According to Mayne et al. (2006) , the control law of the i-th tube-based MPC controller is
where K i is the corresponding feedback-gain matrix.
Fault detection and isolation
3.1. System analysis. In the i-th mode, F takes the value F i and the i-th tube-based MPC controller, the i-th state-input setpoint pair and the i-th observer are used in the closed-loop system. Moreover, the state estimation error of the j-th observer is defined as
Regarding the superscript notationx i,j,i k , the first index means the i-th system mode, the second denotes the j-th observer, and the third denotes that the i-th controller is currently selected for closed-loop operation. Thus,x i,j,i k denotes the state estimation error of the j-th observer when the current closed-loop system is in the i-th mode and with the i-th MPC controller.
If j = i in (10), the dynamics ofx i,j,i k can be derived by using (1), (8) and (9) as
and the corresponding output-estimation error of the j-th observer can also be derived as
Moreover, in the i-th mode, the termx
appearing in both (9) and (11) is denoted as
Its dynamics can be derived by using (5) and (8) as
wherex i,i,i k corresponds to the case j = i in (10) and its dynamics can be obtained from (11), i.e.,
Since ω k ∈ W and η k ∈ V , a robust positively invariant (RPI) set ofx
, can be constructed. In this paper, the notion of RPI sets and the method to construct those are based on the results of Kofman et al. (2007) , Kolmanovsky and Gilbert (1998) , and Olaru et al. (2010) , which are given in Appendix.
As long asx 
For the particular case when j = i, the output-estimation-error setỸ i,i,i corresponding toX
can also be determined and used for FDI. Generally, the RPI setsX i,i,i , E i,i,i andX i,j,i should be as small as possible, being ideally tight approximations of the minimal RPI set.
Fault detection.
The FD approach used in this paper is a passive one based on invariant sets, which can simplify the FD task into only testing whether or not the residual is inside its corresponding invariant set. The advantage of the FD method used consists in its low computational complexity.
Considering (11) and (14), since ω k ∈ W and η k ∈ V , ifū i k ∈Ū i f always holds, it can be observed that, as long as e 
is violated in real time. If a violation of (17) is detected, this means that a fault has occurred. Otherwise, it is considered that the system still operates in the i-th mode.
Although (17) can be used for FD, if only (17) is applied, the fault sensitivity of the proposed FTC scheme will not be fully exploited. The reason is due to the fact that, even though (17) holds, it cannot be guaranteed that the inclusionx
holds, too, which means that the detection ofỹ
In this case, it is necessary to consider the second FD criterion to describe this situation, i.e., to test whether or not
is violated in real time. If (18) is violated, this also implies that a fault has occurred. Note that, as mentioned before, the FD criterion (18) can indirectly describe the inclusions corresponding to the other observers, i.e.,
Thus, the FD strategy of this proposed FTC scheme is to use both (17) and (18). As long as either of them is violated, this implies that the system has become faulty.
Remark 2. (Fault detection)
Simultaneous use of the criteria (17) and (18) means that the system information captured by all the observers has been used for FD. Additionally, for the proposed FD strategy, even though some faults occur, it is possible that the FD criteria (17) and (18) are not violated. This means that these faults cannot be detected and will not actively be tolerated under the framework of this proposed active FTC scheme. Instead, they can only be tolerated to some extent by the PFTC ability of the proposed scheme.
Fault isolation.
3.3.1. Behavior after faults. In the scheme, the FI task is started up after a fault is detected by the proposed FD strategy. With no loss of generality, it is assumed that the l-th (l = i) fault occurs, i.e., after that, the system mode changes from i to l. Although the mode changes from i to l, before the fault is isolated and the system is reconfigured, the closed-loop system structure will not change yet, which implies that the closed-loop system is still composed of the same controller and observer during the FI phase.
According to (1), (5), (8) and (9), when the l-th fault occurs, the state estimation error of the j-th observer changes fromx
and e
with the dynamics
In order to collect all the available system-operating information for fault diagnosis after the l-th fault from the i-th mode, a vector is defined as
According to (20) and (21), the dynamics of ξ i→l k can be obtained as
where E l, i, i , respectively. Moreover, with (2b) , the set of the corresponding output-estimation error can be obtained as
When the system mode switches from i to l, all sets of output-estimation errors can be constructed, which are listed in Table 1 . Note that, in Table 1 , each row excluding the i-th one corresponds to one candidate mode after the mode switching from the i-th one.
3.3.2.
Residual tubes. Generally, the residual is defined as a signal sensitive to faults and with a manageable magnitude.
In this FTC scheme, the output-estimation errors are defined as residual signals. The dynamics ofx l,l,i extracted from (22) are used for FI implementation, which has the form
whilex l,j,i (j = l) will not be used for direct FI implementation but for the establishment of guaranteed FI conditions. By using W and V to replace ω k and Robust MPC for actuator-fault tolerance using set-based passive fault detection and active fault isolation 49 Table 1 . Sets of output-estimation errors. 
Proof.
Since (25a) considers the worst case of the uncertain factors ω k and η k in (24), ifx
It is assumed that the l-th fault is detected at time instant k d when the system is in the i-th mode. If an initial set is used to initialize (25a) at time instant k d , the tubes corresponding to the state and output estimation errors generated by (25) can be denoted as
That initial set is used to initialize the dynamics (25) to generate tubes for FI and introduced here for the discussion of the FI method.
A detailed construction method for set initialization will be presented in Section 3.3.4.
When the system is in the i-th mode, a violation of (17) or (18) implies that a mode changing from i to another unknown mode has occurred (this unknown mode is denoted as f ∈ I \ {i}), i.e., there are p mode candidates except for the i-th one. Thus, for FI, all the p output-estimation error tubesT
, each corresponding to a candidate mode. Moreover, for the p corresponding observers, as long as
are guaranteed at the FD time such that
Therefore, this implies that, among the p generated output-estimation-error tubes after FD, there exists at least one tube (here it is assumed that this tube corresponds to the m-th actuator mode) that can always satisfỹ
If the fault is indexed by l (i.e., f = l) and (27) 
. This implies that the fault will be indicated by one of the p tubes that can always satisfy (29).
Fault isolation approach.
In order to isolate a fault, it has to guarantee that one and only one tube can always satisfy its corresponding inclusion (29) 
In ( can be constructed by considering (31) composed of q inequalities (i.e., strips). Besides, the method proposed by Le et al. (2013) can also be used to construct a zonotopic set containingx
. This method can compute a zonotopic approximation of the intersection of a zonotope and a polytope. With this method, (31) is regarded as a whole that describes a polytope to construct an initial zonotope, which can be seen in Property A5. can be obtained by the method in Propositions A4 or A5. In the second case, it may need to give a zonotopic starting set for the methods in Propositions A4 and A5 and this set can be designed according to the physical constraints of the system. According to (31), it can be observed that, for the j-th observer, the expression of (31) is independent of system mode changing. This means that (31) can always be used to construct a set to bound the state estimation error of the j-th observer in any mode. Since X, U , W and V can be rewritten as zonotopes, from the computational point of view, all tubes are generated by using zonotopes.
Fault-tolerant control
4.1.
Steady-state behaviors. In the proposed FTC scheme, system operation is divided into the transient-state and steady-state phases. The steady-state operation is observed when all relevant system signals corresponding to a system mode are inside their corresponding bounding sets.
Comparatively, the transient-state operation describes the operating process between fault occurrence and the steady-state operation of the mode corresponding to this fault.
In this paper, these two operations will be discussed, separately. This subsection focuses on system behavior during the steady-state operation.
At steady state of the i-th mode, the tube-based MPC technique proposed by Mayne et al. (2006) is adopted to implement FTC, and the control law of the i-th one is given in (9). For the tube-based MPC controller (9), the key partū X and U are hard system constraints that imply indirect constraints on the nominal system-based open-loop optimization problem. In the i-th mode, the indirect input constraint is computed via (9), i.e.,
As in Section 3.1, at a steady state of the i-th mode,
should hold. Thus, the input-constraint set of the open-loop optimization problem can be obtained as
Additionally, taking
into account, the hard state-constraint set for steady-state functioning can be described as
Assumption 5. (Indirect constraint sets) In the i-th mode, X i andŪ i are non-empty for all i ∈ I.
The non-emptiness ofX i andŪ i is the precondition for using the tube-based MPC technique. Assumption 5 is a well-known and accepted condition in the field. Under Assumption 5, the open-loop optimization problem of the i-th tube-based MPC controller, based on the i-th nominal system (5), has the following form:
Robust MPC for actuator-fault tolerance using set-based passive fault detection and active fault isolation 51 is the optimized control sequence over the horizon N , Q i R i and P i are positive-definite matrices, andX i T is the corresponding terminal state constraint set. The purpose of adding the terminal constraint in (34) is for the feasibility and stability. In (34),X i T is defined as the maximal control invariant (MCI) set of the i-th nominal system corresponding to the nominal constraint setsX i andŪ i such that the i-th tube-based MPC controller is feasible (see Definition A6 in Appendix for the MCI sets). As mentioned in Remark 3, the tube-based MPC controller can be designed to make the closed-loop system stable; see the works of Borrelli et al. (2013) and Mayne et al. (2006) for details of tube-based MPC.
4.2.
Transient-state behavior before FD. As mentioned before, after fault occurrence, the system quits from the steady-state operation and enters the transient-state operation. Different from the steady-state operation of the i-th mode, fault occurrence implies that the system mode changes from the i-th one to another one that will be denoted by an index l (l = i).
In order to analyze the transient-state behavior induced by a fault, the transient-state operation is divided into three different phases. The first one starts from the occurrence till detection of the fault, the second starts from the detection to isolation of the fault and the third begins from system reconfiguration to the steady-state operation of the l-th mode. Taking into account that the second and third phases of the transition correspond to the FI task, this subsection only focuses on the first-phase transition while the other two transient-state phases will be discussed in the next subsection. 
Although the FD criteria (17) and (18) still hold during the first phase of the transition, it cannot be guaranteed that
can still hold, which can be observed from (20) and (21). This problem is inevitable. Because the satisfaction of (35) cannot be guaranteed, during this transient-state phase, the state constraint
may be violated. However, notice that, during the first phase of the transition, the input constraint
always holds under the satisfaction of Assumption 5 and e l,i,i k ∈ E i,i,i . As has been mentioned, since the problem indicated in (35) is inevitable, the satisfaction of the state constraint has to be assumed during this phase.
Assumption 6. (First-phase transition) During the first-phase transition, the inclusion x
Since the open-loop optimization problem in (34) is not affected by the real system, its feasibility can always be preserved during the first phase of the transition. Moreover, during this phase, the closed-loop system is still composed of the same elements with the i-th faultfree mode. Although the l-th fault has occurred, the process assumes that the system still operates in the i-th mode as long as both state and input constraints are satisfied.
Transient-state behavior during FI.
The active FI task corresponds to the second phase of the transition. During this phase, it is already known that a fault has occurred in the system. Thus, the most important objective is to isolate the fault. The basic FI principle here is to directly change the input-constraint set of the i-th open-loop optimization problem on the i-th nominal system to indirectly change the input set of the plant to force the satisfaction of the proposed FI conditions by means of the constraint-handling ability of the open-loop MPC optimization problem behind the MPC controller. In this way, the plant input vector can be confined into a predefined set U i f to excite the system and to obtain more system-operating information for FI implementation. Note that U i f for active FI has already been briefly introduced in Remark 1.
As observed from (22) and (23), when the system mode changes from i to l, the sets of the state and output estimation errors are determined by the sets ofū i k , ω k and η k , and the fault magnitudes if it is considered that the observer and feedback gains have already been designed. Without explicitly considering the observer and feedback gains, a function is used to describe the sets of the output-estimation errors to help the readers understand the proposed FI approach, i.e.,
which implies that whether or not the guaranteed FI conditions in Proposition 2 hold depends on adjusting the set of the nominal inputsū , and then the FI approach proposed in Section 3.3 can be used to isolate the fault. Thus, when the system is in the i-th mode, the tube-based MPC controller has two objectives:
• Steady-state operation (including the first-phase transition): no fault is detected and the main task is to achieve system performance. Thus, in order to make full use of the potential performance of the system, the input-constraint setŪ i is used for the i-th open-loop optimization problem.
• Transient-state operation (only the second phase): a fault is detected and the main task is to isolate and reconfigure the system to obtain satisfactory performance even in the presence of the fault. During the second phase of the transition (i.e., the FI process), in addition to guaranteeing the satisfaction of the FI conditions, the feasibility, stability and constraint satisfaction of the controller and system should also be considered. The optimization problem (34) is updated by directly using the nominal state from the nominal prediction model. The nominal states are generated by the nominal prediction model free from the effect of the real system. Thus, as long as the i-th open-loop optimization problem can be designed to be feasible, the feasibility feature of the optimization can be preserved during the whole FI process if the constraints X and U are not considered. Since the set of the nominal input vectors of the i-th nominal system is adjusted for FI, the feasibility of the i-th optimization problem should be preserved by using a new pair of constraint sets.
Thus, during the FI process, except that the input constraint of (34) Notice that the selection of the pair (u k ∈ U and x k ∈ X) plays an important role in the proposed FTC scheme. Since the methodological procedure of selecting that pair is out of the scope of this paper,Ū For the proposed FI strategy, the constraint sets of i-th open-loop optimization should be adjusted for FI implementation at the FD time k d . Thus, based on Proposition 3, the following strategy is proposed to guarantee the feasibility of the MPC controller during FI: (34) is always feasible during the FI process according to Proposition 3.
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T is used to update (34) to guarantee feasibility at time instant
T , the feasibility of (34) can always be guaranteed for all k > k * . Otherwise, the center ofX f i T is still used to update (34) till the inclusionx
The aforementioned strategy to guarantee feasibility comes from a practical viewpoint. Moreover, since set operation and representation are based on zonotopes,X f i T should also be a zonotope and its center can always be obtained to update the open-loop optimization problem as a remedial measure.
During the second phase of the transition, the feasibility of both the open-loop optimization and constraint satisfaction problems can be guaranteed by using the aforementioned method. However, another important aspect of the proposed FTC scheme is the stability of the closed-loop scheme.
Generally, to guarantee this feature, two points should be considered: the stability of the closed-loop dynamics, which can be guaranteed by Remark 3, and the feasibility and stability of the open-loop optimization problem (34), which can be guaranteed by using the terminal-state constraint and selecting suitable control parameters as shown in (34). Particularly, this paper follows the procedure presented by Mayne et al. (2006) in order to design a stabilizing tube-based MPC controller.
Transient-state behavior after FI.
In the FTC scheme, when a fault is isolated at time instant k i , at the same time the system should be reconfigured with a different tube-based MPC controller that corresponds to this new mode. After the controller adjusting, the FTC scheme will face the same feasibility problem as during the second phase of the transition: it is assumed that the l-th actuator mode is isolated. Thus, the l-th tube-based MPC controller with the corresponding input and state constraints should be used, the l-th observer is employed to obtain the state estimation, and the l-th nominal system is used to generate the nominal states for the l-th open-loop optimization problem.
In order to guarantee feasibility after system reconfiguration, two methods are proposed. The first one is similar to the second-phase transition, which uses the center ofX l T to update the l-th open-loop optimization problem at one time instant when
The second method is to use a state valuex l ki ∈ X l T to initialize the l-th nominal system and open-loop optimization at the FI time instant k i . With either of the two methods, according to Proposition 3, the feasibility of the l-th open-loop optimization problem can always be preserved after reconfiguration. Additionally, the system can also keep being stable during this phase.
During this third-phase transition, except for the feasibility, stability and constraint satisfaction, a right restart of the FD mechanism still needs to be guaranteed. After system reconfiguration, the closed-loop system is operating in the l-th mode. Thus, the restarting of the FD mechanism should be considered to monitor the mode-switching behavior in this new mode. However, since in the FTC scheme the implementation of FD is based on invariant sets, if the FD mechanism is simultaneously restarted when the system is reconfigured, it is possible that the FD strategy creates false FD alarms. This situation will appear if the signalsỹ In this paper, there are also two methods to avoid false FD alarms. The first one is to set a waiting time; as long as this waiting time is sufficiently long, after the waiting time, the signals can enter into their sets and the restarting of the FD mechanism can be done in the right way. In the second one after reconfiguration,
are tested until at a time instant both inclusions hold. Then, at this time instant, the FD mechanism is restarted in the new operating mode to avoid false FD alarms.
Remark 7. (Waiting time)
The waiting time can be arbitrarily defined as long as it can assure right restarting of the FD mechanism such that the aforementioned false FD alarms can be avoided. However, it is better to define the waiting time with a proper length based on the settling time of the system. 4.5. Fault-tolerant control procedure. In previous sections, the FDI and FTC approaches have been introduced in detail. In this subsection, the key point is to make a brief summary for the proposed FTC scheme, which is presented as follows:
• It is assumed that the system is in a steady state of the i-th mode. The FD task consists in real-time testing whether or not (17) or (18) is violated. If no violation is detected, it is considered that the system is still in the i-th mode. Otherwise, it is implied that a fault has occurred in the system.
• Once a fault is detected at time instant k d , the active FI approach will be started up to isolate the fault by adjusting the constraints of (34) FI conditions on-line. Notice that the corresponding methods to guarantee the feasibility should be used during this phase.
• Simultaneously, at k = k d , p output-estimation-error tubes (26) are initialized by using initial sets constructed by (31). For each tube, (29) is tested in real time. Whenever a tube violates (29), the index of this tube is removed from the fault candidates until there is one and only one tube left, which implies that the fault is isolated and that the index of this tube indicates the fault.
• Once the fault is isolated (it is assumed that the fault is indexed by l), the l-th observer, the l-th tube-based MPC controller and the l-th state-input pair are selected to reconfigure the system (now the constraint sets should beX • After the system enters the steady state of the l-th mode, the whole working procedure of the proposed scheme will be revisited to monitor this new mode and the control objective is to regulate the system around the corresponding setpoint.
To further help the readers understand the the approach proposed in this paper, a flow chart describing the FTC procedure is presented in Fig. 2 , where the whole procedure is divided into five steps: FI conditions, fault detection, active fault isolation, fault-tolerant control and steady-state operation.
Illustrative example
A two-tank system taken from the work of Steffen (2005) , shown in Fig. 3 , is used as an example to illustrate the proposed FTC scheme. The mathematical model of this two-tank system can be found in the work of Osella et al. (2015). With a sampling time of 0.01 s, the dynamics of the system can be represented in discrete-time form as
with
where F i is used to model the actuator status (healthy or faulty), and it is further assumed that |ω| ≤ 0.001 0.001 T and |η| ≤ 0.001 0.001 T .
In this case study, faults in actuators are considered. In total, there are three actuator modes taken into account, i.e., F 0 (healthy mode), F 1 (a fault in the first actuator), and F 2 (a fault in the second actuator):
The water levels of the two tanks should vary within a range because of the physical limitations. Moreover, actuators also have a limited range of operation. Thus, the system state and input constraints describing the limits of water levels and valves are set as
Based on (37), three observers with the form (8) are designed, each matching one actuator mode. With no loss of generality, the same poles are defined for the three observers for simplicity, i.e., p = [0.2, 0.1] T . Thus, the three designed observer gains are
Accordingly, three tube-based MPC controllers corresponding to the three modes are designed to control the system, whose feedback gains are designed as In this example, two fault scenarios are considered, each one corresponding to one actuator fault:
• Scenario 1: from time instants 1 to 75, the system is healthy, and from 76 to 150, the first actuator fault occurs.
• Scenario 2: from time instants 1 to 75, the system is healthy, and from 76 to 150, the second actuator fault occurs.
For these two scenarios, after a fault occurrence, a pair of active FI input and state sets need to be designed With no loss of generality, only scenarios from healthy to faulty are considered to illustrate this FTC scheme. Thus, corresponding toŪ 0 f , the after-fault sets of output-estimation errors of the two actuator-fault modes switched from the healthy mode can be constructed, which are shown in Fig. 4 . The figure shows that the active FI setŪ 0 f can satisfy the guaranteed FI conditions in Proposition 2. This implies that, after detection of either of the two faults, it is guaranteed that the fault can be isolated by using the proposed FI approach.
For comparison, Fig. 5 demonstrates the after-fault sets without active FI. In this case, the after-fault output-estimation-error sets from the healthy mode should be constructed by using the input setŪ 0 that can be computed by (32). In Fig. 5 
, y and u, respectively. Since the output matrix is the identity matrix, the figure of system states is omitted here for simplicity.
For the first fault scenario, the FD results are shown in Fig. 6 , whereỹ i00 86 (1) ∈Ỹ 000 (1) indicates that a fault is detected at this time instant. Thus, the proposed active FI process is activated at the time instant k = 86. Furthermore, it is obtained thatỹ hold, which implies that the fault in the first actuator has occurred. Then the whole system is reconfigured to tolerate the fault. Accordingly, the inputs and outputs of Scenario 1 are presented in Fig. 8 , which shows that the proposed FTC scheme can tolerate this fault with Robust MPC for actuator-fault tolerance using set-based passive fault detection and active fault isolation satisfactory performance. Moreover, all the constraints can be well satisfied during the whole process.
For the second scenario, the simulation results are shown in Figs. 9-11. In Fig. 9 , it is shown that an actuator fault is detected at time instant k = 80 becauseỹ i00 80 (1) ∈ Y 000 (1) is detected. Thus, at the FD time k = 80, the active FI process is started as seen in Fig. 10 . Similarly, in hold, which implies that the second actuator fault is isolated at time instant k = 81. Once the second fault is isolated, the system is reconfigured by the corresponding MPC controller and state-input setpoint pair. The results in Fig. 11 show that, although the output performance has a slight degradation, the AFTC strategy can generally obtain satisfactory performance and the constraints are always well satisfied.
Remark 10. (Restarting of the FD mechanism)
In order to avoid false fault alarms, whenever the system is reconfigured, a waiting time of 20 sampling times is set. During the waiting time, the FD mechanism is frozen till this period elapses. Then the FD mechanism is restarted again to monitor a new mode. 
Conclusions
In this paper, an actuator FTC scheme combining tube-based MPC and set-theoretic FDI was proposed. In the scheme, FD is passive by using invariant sets and FI is active by relying on MPC and tubes, which is the most important contribution of this paper. The use of tube-based MPC and set-theoretic FDI is interesting because of their relatively low computational complexity, FDI robustness and their proper combination to implement the proposed active FI strategy. Thus, the proposed FTMPC scheme owns robust FDI performance, low computational complexity and less conservative FI conditions. The key idea of this FTC scheme consists in designing the input and state sets for active FI. In this paper, these sets are chosen by off-line trial and error as a pragmatic method, which can be improved if a systematic designing method can be proposed for the input and state FI sets in the future. It should be emphasized that the proposed FTC scheme cannot detect all faults. Thus, for undetectable faults, the PFTC ability of this scheme can still tolerate them to some extent even though a possible degree of performance degradation may appear. Due to tube-based MPC, the advantages of the proposed FTC scheme consist in its relatively simple structure and less conservative active FI. In the future, the authors will focus on designing state-input-constraint sets to further improve this FTC scheme. 
